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Abstract
Background: The University Hospital Heidelberg is implementing a Regional Health Information Network (RHIN) in the
Rhine-Neckar-Region in order to establish a shared-care environment, which is based on established Health IT standards
and in particular Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE). Similar to all other Electronic Health Record (EHR) and
Personal Health Record (PHR) approaches the chosen Personal Electronic Health Record (PEHR) architecture relies on
the patient’s consent in order to share documents and medical data with other care delivery organizations, with the
additional requirement that the German legislation explicitly demands a patients’ opt-in and does not allow opt-out
solutions. This creates two issues: firstly the current IHE consent profile does not address this approach properly and
secondly none of the employed intra- and inter-institutional information systems, like almost all systems on the market,
offers consent management solutions at all. Hence, the objective of our work is to develop and introduce an extensible
architecture for creating, managing and querying patient consents in an IHE-based environment.
Methods: Based on the features offered by the IHE profile Basic Patient Privacy Consent (BPPC) and literature, the
functionalities and components to meet the requirements of a centralized opt-in consent management solution
compliant with German legislation have been analyzed. Two services have been developed and integrated into the
Heidelberg PEHR.
Results: The standard-based Consent Management Suite consists of two services. The Consent Management
Service is able to receive and store consent documents. It can receive queries concerning a dedicated patient
consent, process it and return an answer. It represents a centralized policy enforcement point. The Consent Creator
Service allows patients to create their consents electronically. Interfaces to a Master Patient Index (MPI) and a
provider index allow to dynamically generate XACML-based policies which are stored in a CDA document to be
transferred to the first service. Three workflows have to be considered to integrate the suite into the PEHR:
recording the consent, publishing documents and viewing documents.
Conclusions: Our approach solves the consent issue when using IHE profiles for regional health information
networks. It is highly interoperable due to the use of international standards and can hence be used in any other
region to leverage consent issues and substantially promote the use of IHE for regional health information
networks in general.
Background
IT-based inter-organizational and inter-sectoral commu-
nication in healthcare is required to accomplish the
increasing demands of healthcare providers especially
regarding quality of care and economical aspects. There
exist different approaches and products to address this
issue. Personal Health Record (PHR) and Electronic
Health Record (EHR) systems are in widespread use in
various projects around the world providing different
advantages and disadvantages with respect to technical,
ethical and data privacy issues as well as patient empow-
erment aspects. However, all approaches depend on the
patient’s consent in order to share documents and medi-
cal data with other care delivery organizations. The
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consent has to be given voluntarily on a well informed
and competent basis. The patient has the right to know
how his information is processed and who is able to
access it and for which purposes. On one hand these
requirements strengthen the autonomy of the patient
implying a demand to participate in his healthcare. On
the other hand the patient consent imposes new techni-
cal requirements on the PHR and EHR systems which
are not yet implemented by most of the vendors. Even
the ISO 20514 [1] does not address the consent issue
although the problem has been discussed for several
years as the existing literature reveals [2-8].
Similarly to other regions the Rhein-Neckar-Region
with its 2.3 Million inhabitants aims to establish a regio-
nal health information network (RHIN). For this net-
work the University Hospital Heidelberg designed a
Personal Electronic Health Record (PEHR) architecture
based on a service oriented architecture (SOA) accord-
ing to profiles from the initiative Integrating the Health-
care Enterprise (IHE) and international standards like
HL7 and DICOM [9,10]. The PEHR concept envisions a
strong patient involvement to take patients’ rights into
account giving patients full control of the management
of the access rights. The data privacy aspects and the
management of access rights in this context have been
discussed in depth earlier [11].
According to the German legislation, it is mandatory
to provide consent mechanisms that comply with the
opt-in principle in order to transfer medical data elec-
tronically between different institutions [12]. The regula-
tions demand in particular that no data-transfer occurs
prior to the patients’ opt-in.
In order to address this issue for our regional network,
theoretical considerations led to an abstract model for a
consent management solution. Two implementable,
practical approaches were derived from that model, a
centralized and a decentralized approach [13].
With respect to a standardized implementation, the
IHE Basic Patient Privacy Consent profile (BPPC) [14]
provides opt-in support, but important aspects like e.g.
how to structure a consent document and how to make
the legal text machine-readable, are not specified.
Hence, two additional services were needed in order to
solve the consent issue in our RHIN, namely a Consent
Creator Service (CCS) used by the patient to create a
consent document and the so-called Consent Manage-
ment Service (CMS) to manage the consent documents
generated by the patients.
The present publication firstly describes a technical
solution for a Consent Management Suite (COMS) with
a centralized approach, related to the BPPC profile
using IHE XDS.b, HL7 Version 3 Clinical Document
Architecture (CDA) and the OASIS eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) and secondly an
integration solution into IHE-based RHINs like the one
in the Rhine-Neckar Region.
The objectives of this paper are:
• to describe and introduce an extensible and stan-
dard-based architecture for creating and managing
patient consents (store and query electronically) in
order to share medical data in an IHE XDS.b based
PEHR scenario especially fulfilling the requirements
of the opt-in approach
• to enrich the IHE-BPPC profile by formulating
solutions for the undefined open aspects and to pro-
vide a practically usable solution which can poten-
tially serve as a reference implementation
• to demonstrate how a centralized COMS can be
integrated into an existing service oriented RHIN
systems landscape.
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE)
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) is a joint
initiative by healthcare professionals and manufac-
turers. The basic approach is that in a first step users
design clinically feasible workflows supporting daily
healthcare practice, which are in a second step trans-
ferred into a detailed technical specification. The
results are grouped in so-called integration profiles
consisting of actors and transactions. Actors can be
implemented in systems like Hospital Information Sys-
tems (HIS) and communicate using transactions. For
each transaction IHE defines which standard (e.g. HL7
or DICOM) should be used and how communication
shall be implemented [15].
Cross Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS.b) Profile
The Cross Enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) integra-
tion profile defines how to share medical documents
across the boundaries of healthcare institutions like e.g.
hospitals or physician’s practices. The following actors
are used in the context of our work: Document Source
Actor and Document Consumer. These actors commu-
nicate via the following transactions with a Document
Registry and Document Repository: Provide and Register
Document Set-b transaction, Registry Stored Query and
Retrieve Document Set transaction [16].
Basic Patient Privacy Consents (BPPC) Profile
The BPPC profile [14] provides guidance on how to
address consent aspects in IHE-based RHINs in a so-
called XDS affinity domain (AD). An AD is an affiliation
of e.g. healthcare providers in a region who have
decided to share information of their jointly treated
patients via e.g. shared-care records, i.e. a PEHR.
The present publication solely provides recommen-
dations for XDS scenarios. BPPC provides the creation
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of a basic vocabulary of codes identifying the different
privacy policies of which a consent document is made
up. Such a policy should include the legal text (what
should be shared, which users or roles may access the
information and when, etc.) as well as a unique patient
privacy consent identifier (OID). This OID should be
used to mark published documents using the attribute
“confidentialityCode”. Opt-in scenarios can be imple-
mented using a dedicated policy enforcing that nothing
is to be shared prior to the patients’ opt-in. When
using XDS.b, like in our work, two actors are required
for implementing BPPC: the Document Source Actor
and its transaction Provide and Register Document
Set-b (ITI-41) and the Document Consumer Actor
with the transactions Retrieve Document Set (ITI-43)
and Registry Stored Query (ITI-18). According to
BPPC, these actors are to implement the Basic Privacy
Enforcement Option as well as the Basic Patient Priv-
acy Proof Option. The first option enforces that the
XDS Registry has to validate whether all documents do
contain a confidentialityCode from the AD vocabulary.
The second enables a document consumer to query for
Patient Privacy Consent Acknowledgement Documents
with the document class ‘consent’. The returned Event-
CodeList contains the information of underlying poli-
cies [17].
The following basic process is outlined in the profile:
• Recording a patient’s acknowledgement of a priv-
acy consent policy via Content Consumer Actor
• Checking for a patient’s acknowledgement of a
privacy consent policy (Basic Patient Privacy Proof
Option)
• Publishing documents according to a consent pol-
icy (Document Source Actor has to check whether a
policy exists allowing to publish the document. If
yes, he has to set the OIDs to the confidentiality-
Code attribute of the document).
• Using published documents (The document consu-
mer actor should enforce his own access control
based on the returned EventCodeList)
In general, a consent document itself contains sensi-
tive information. This should be taken into account
within each affinity domain [14].
HL7 Version 2 Medical Document Messages (MDM)
HL7 Medical Document Message (MDM) is a message
type form the HL7 Version 2 family. MDMs are
designed to transport medical documents either by
reference or with content. The latter requires the encod-
ing of the document in Base64 and adding the text
string to the observation segment (OBX) [18].
HL7 Version 2 Query/Response Conformance Statements
The HL7 Query/Response Conformance Statements pro-
vide a mechanism to build query messages in different
ways. In our work, query by parameter (QBP) messages
were used on the basis of the interrogative interaction
model. This implies that the service receiving a query
message has to respond with a response message [19].
HL7 Version 3 Clinical Document Architecture (CDA)
The HL7 Clinical Document Architecture (CDA) is a
document markup standard that specifies the structure
and semantics of clinical documents in order to standar-
dize them for exchange. A CDA document is defined as
an information object which can include text, images
and other multimedia content. Documents are encoded
in XML. Meanings of single parts are derived from the
HL7 Reference Information Model (RIM) and use the
HL7 Version 3 data types. Major components are the
header element, containing document meta data, and
the body element containing the medical data. Three
different levels are defined describing the degree of
semantic interoperability reaching from plain text to
fully structured and coded information. Two of the
CDA’s characteristics are human-readability as well as
machine-readability [20].
Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
The Extensible Access Control Markup Language is an
XML-based OASIS standard. It provides syntax to
define policies and specifies how to interpret these poli-
cies in order to allow or deny the requested action from
a caller. Three major instances are defined which have
to be implemented in a system environment using
authentication on XACML-basis: The Policy Adminis-
tration Point (PAP) is the system which manages the
policies. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is responsible
to evaluate and issue authorization decisions. The Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) finally has to be implemented
in the system which captures user’s access request to a
resource and enforces PDP’s decision [21].
Methods
Based on the capabilities and features offered by the IHE
profile BPPC [14], previous work [13] as well as litera-
ture ([2-8,22-24]), the necessary functionalities and com-
ponents to meet the requirements and workflows of a
centralized opt-in consent management solution for IHE
XDS.b based RHIN were designed and modeled using
the Unified Modeling Language (UML).
In order to implement the two different services of
COMS, Java was used as programming language and
Apache Tomcat respectively the JBoss Application Ser-
ver served as application server running both services.
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For storing and querying the consent documents, the
CMS was designed using HL7 MDMs to receive consent
documents and HL7 QBP messages to query the CMS
in order to receive particular consent information. The
implementation was conducted with the open eHealth
integration platform (IPF) from the Open eHealth Foun-
dation [25]. For testing purposes, consents were stored
in an open source IHE XDS.b Registry and Repository
called openxds from the Open Health Tools project
(OHT) [26] and the OHT Master Patient Index (MPI)
was used to identify patients. Consents will later be
stored in the Registry and Repository of the Heidelberg
PEHR project.
In addition to BPPC and XDS.b profiles, XACML and
HL7 CDA were used to build the consent documents with
the CCS according to the patients’ requests, which also
renders them technically and semantically interoperable
and ensures machine-readability of the consent docu-
ments. The identification of healthcare providers was
achieved by a Provider and Organization Registry Service
(PORS) developed in a prior Heidelberg project [27].
Results
The first section is dedicated to a description of the
insufficiently defined parts within the BBPC profile for
opt-in scenarios and possible solution approaches, fol-
lowed by sections on the COMS architecture, the inter-
faces, the integration into an IHE-based RHIN as well as
its supported workflows according to IHE BPPC and the
structure of the consent documents. Although the two
services of COMS are designed to be used in networks
of this kind, they can also be used separately in any
other scenario that requires the management of con-
sents e.g. the secondary use of clinical information.
BPPC deficits for opt-in scenarios
As described above, BPPC provides many useful func-
tions and recommendations to manage patients’ consent
documents. However, there is a gap between the pro-
vided functionality and the requirements for opt-in
based consent management approaches which consists
of three main issues:
• BPPC demands the usage of OIDs in the “confiden-
tialityCode” field. At present there is no recommenda-
tion or specification on how to proceed with legacy
documents lacking this attribute. Additionally, the Basic
Patient Privacy Proof requires returning all privacy poli-
cies to the decentralized policy decision points, which
could lead to privacy issues in certain circumstances.
• There is no workflow description for the manage-
ment of consent documents.
• The so-called “advanced patient privacy consents”, i.
e. excluding a particular physician from accessing the
information cannot be implemented with BPPC. A
policy in the sense of BPPC identifies who has access to
which information, but the mechanism for publishing
this policy is not specified.
The first issue is addressed by not using confidentiali-
tyCodes for the patient’s consent. Of course each trans-
action and the documents themselves are under a
certain policy in an opt-in setting. Hence, a document
consumer or a document source has to verify prior to
the execution of a transaction whether it is allowed to
conduct it or not. The second issue is solved by estab-
lishing a centralized policy decision point represented by
the CMS, which is also responsible for the management
of consent documents. The third issue is addressed by
using XACML techniques embedded into the CDA pol-
icy document. Our approach is also applicable for opt-
out scenarios.
The following sections describe the implemented
COMS solution in detail as well as the integration into
the Heidelberg PEHR.
Architecture of COMS and integration into IHE-based
environments
The COMS consists of two different services (Figure 1).
The CMS takes responsibility for receiving consent
documents in a structured format (see paragraph con-
sent document), for storing them and for handling con-
sent queries from connected systems. In the Heidelberg
PEHR project the CMS represents all three: the policy
administration point (PAP), the policy decision point
(PDP) and the policy enforcement point (PEP). The
integration of those three elements into one service is
due to the requirements of the German opt-in regula-
tion. Otherwise, connected systems could unrightfully
gain access to information which is not intended for
them. The second service is the CCS. The patient uses
this service to create consent documents according to
the structured format described in the “consent docu-
ment” paragraph. CCS can build the consent document
dynamically by creating XACML-based policies using
information from PORS containing all connected physi-
cians and care delivery organizations. This approach
allows advanced patient privacy consents. Figure 1
shows how both services, CMS and CCS, are integrated
into the service oriented IHE-based architecture of the
Heidelberg PEHR. The patient will use the CCS to man-
age his consent. The connected primary systems are
using CMS to verify particular actions like e.g. publish-
ing documents into the PEHR. The PEHR system itself
will use CMS in order to acknowledge the access and
review of documents for invoking physicians.
Consent Management Service
The CMS consists of a three-layer architecture (Figure
2). The interface layer provides a document listener and
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a query listener. The first one can receive consent docu-
ments via HL7 v2 MDMs or a SOAP web service both
containing the CDA consent documents. The latter
receives queries for consent policies using HL7 QBP
messages. Figure 3 displays an example of such a query.
Inside the query parameter definition (QPD) segment,
actors have to enter their queries. Possible values are
specified and implemented among the affinity domain
members. The listener uses the validation engine from
the logic layer in order to validate messages, documents
and queries. The authorization manager is the core of
CMS and implements the PDP and PEP. It uses the sto-
rage engine in order to get consent documents related
to the appropriate patient from the query. According to
the query, the authorization manager checks whether
the requested action is allowed or not and processes the
response. The storage engine is responsible for storing
and retrieving consent documents either from an XDS.b
Registry/Repository using the transactions ITI-41 and
ITI-43 or from a file system depending on the config-
uration of the CMS.
Consent Creator Service
The CCS is a Java-based tool providing a web-based
interface in order to create a consent document based
on CDA and XACML. The web-interface can be inte-
grated into the context of a primary system like a HIS
or like in our case into the patient view of the PEHR. A
patient can create and edit the personal consent docu-
ment in order to manage a) who has access to docu-
ments in the record, b) which primary systems, like
hospital information systems or practice management
systems can add new documents and c) which docu-
ment types should be transferred to the PEHR. The
patient can choose providers or organizations according
to their hierarchy (organization ® role® person) from
a dynamically generated list and allocate the desired
rights. Document types are configured by administrators
Figure 1 Consent Management Suite (COMS) in the context of a regional health information network (RHIN). Overview of COMS and its
services (yellow) in IHE-based regional health networks using the Heidelberg PEHR as an example.
Heinze et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:58
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/58
Page 5 of 11
Figure 2 Architecture of the Consent Management Service (CMS). The CMS has a three-layer architecture. The Interface Layer provides a
document listener and a query listener. The first one receives consent documents and the latter queries for consent policies. The listener uses
the validation engine from the Logic Layer in order to validate messages, documents and queries. The authorization manager is the core of CMS
and implements the PDP and PEP. It uses the storage engine to fetch consent documents for a particular patient.
Figure 3 Example of an HL7 Query to the Consent Management Service. Queries are built using the HL7 Query/Response conformance
statements. The message header (MSH) segment contains meta data including: the sending and receiving application, time stamps and versions.
The essential part of the message is the query parameter definition (QPD) segment including the query characteristics. Possible values are
defined and specified among the affinity domain members.
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of the affinity domain. Patients can select on the basis of
the document hierarchy in combination with a specific
organization (document class ® document type, e.g.
referral letters ® referral letters from cardiology) as well
as exclude a dedicated document instance (e.g. referral
letter from cardiology of University Hospital Heidelberg
dated 15th of August). The service creates an XACML-
based policy-set according to the patient’s choices and
stores it as CDA document. The mapping of the
patient’s choices to an XACML representation is done
on the basis of a deny based PEP and the combining
algorithm “first-applicalble”. For each hierarchy linree
(Providers and Content) there is a policy inside the pol-
icy-set containing several rules. These rules are pro-
cessed in a bottom-up approach from fine- to coarse-
grained until a match occurs.
The completed consent document is sent to the CMS
via an HL7v2 MDM for validation and storage. Consents
can also be changed and updated in a similar way. The
CCS provides interfaces to the MPI as well as to the
PORS in order to identify patients, physicians and orga-
nizations correctly.
The consent document
The consent document itself is an HL7 Version 3 CDA
document based on the definitions of the BPPC profile
(Figure 4). It contains the fundamental and universal
text for consents related to a dedicated affinity domain
and essential information about the patient (MPI-ID),
the author, the legal authenticator, the involved provi-
ders and organizations (PORS-ID) as well as the consent
rules chosen by the patient. These choices (which per-
son or organization is allowed to perform which trans-
actions on which documents) are technically
characterized in policies, which are bundled in a policy
set. These policies are represented in XACML inside the
body structure of the CDA document. Each policy con-
sists of a human-readable text describing the effect of
the policy and a machine-readable section containing
the coding of the policy for retrieving and processing.
The tremendous advantage of CDA is to provide both, a
human readable presentation of the document and a
machine-readable version. The CDA document can also
include a PDF transformation of the consent and
optionally a digital signature. It can be printed for signa-
ture by the patient and for archiving purposes to ensure
legal compliance.
Integration of COMS into an XDS.b based setting
The integration of the COMS into an IHE XDS.b based
setting is described in the following for the Heidelberg
PEHR architecture which provides a PIX/PDQ-based
MPI, an XDS.b Registry and Repository as well as a
PORS. Three core workflows are required for handling
consents in opt-in based IHE XDS.b scenarios: the crea-
tion of the consent, the inclusion of clinical documents
into the PEHR and thirdly the access to those.
The first workflow encompasses the recording of a
patient’s consent (Figure 5). The patient logs on to his
PEHR which then interfaces to the GUI of the CCS
allowing the patient to create or change his consent
document. In a first step the CCS queries the MPI to
receive the global identification of the patient (MPI-ID).
Afterwards, it queries the PORS to obtain the latest and
actual list of providers and organizations of the affinity
domain. Then the patient can select which organization
or which provider is allowed to review documents inside
the PEHR and which system is granted to publish new
documents to the record. The flexibility of XACML
additionally offers the possibility to exclude specific
document types. By the time the patient has finished his
consent document, the CCS transfers the document to
the CMS using an HL7 MDM message. The CMS
extracts necessary meta data (e.g. MPI-ID) from the
Figure 4 Structure of the consent document. The consent
document is based on HL7 version 3 CDA. The header contains
meta data about the patient (e.g. MPI-ID), the author and the legal
authenticator. The body displays information like the involved
providers and organizations as well as the consent information itself
as assembled by the patient. The consent content (which person or
organization is allowed to perform which transactions on which
documents) is represented in an XACML policy set inside the body
structure of the CDA document as well as in a PDF representation
and can optionally have a digital or wet signature.
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message and sends the document to the Registry and
Repository using the IHE transaction ITI-41.
This is the trigger allowing documents to be published
to the PEHR or clinical documents to be viewed using
the PEHR according to the rules defined in the consent
document.
Figure 6 demonstrates the second workflow: publish-
ing documents by primary systems. Primary systems like
e.g. HIS participating in the RHIN have to verify techni-
cally whether they are allowed to perform a particular
transaction initiated by a healthcare professional. To
obtain this consent information, primary systems con-
nected to an affinity domain have to implement the
Document Source Actor and the Content Creator Actor
which queries the CMS. The primary system has to
fetch the MPI-ID of the relevant patient and the PORS-
ID of the inquiring organization and the inquiring physi-
cian in order to build an HL7 query conformance state-
ment. This request is sent to the CMS which extracts
the patient and loads the corresponding consent docu-
ment from the repository using the transaction Retrieve
Document Set (ITI-43). On the basis of the query and
the content of the consent document, it generates the
response message to the calling system. When publish-
ing is allowed, the primary system can publish the docu-
ment to the repository using the Provide and Register
Document Set transaction (ITI-41). This consent verifi-
cation process within the primary system is mandatory
due to the German legislation which forbids the transfer
of any kind of data prior to the patient’s opt-in. Hence
verifying the consent first within the PEHR would be
illegal since patient data would leave the hospital envir-
onment without prior permission. However, some sce-
narios and settings may for security reasons require an
additional verification process by the PEHR system itself.
The third and last workflow illustrates (Figure 7) how
published documents can be reviewed using the PEHR.
A physician logs on to the PEHR (either using the web
frontend or via single sign-on from the primary system)
and starts a search for a particular patient. The PEHR
system knows the MPI-ID from its MPI and the corre-
sponding PORS-ID from the logged-in user and imple-
ments the Document Consumer Actor as well as the
Content Consumer Actor to generate an HL7 query
message (QBP) in order to ask the CMS for permission.
CMS retrieves the consent document from the reposi-
tory using ITI-18 and ITI-43 and processes the consent
against the query. In case allowance is generally granted,
the CMS would return a list of allowed documents to
the PEHR system via the HL7 QBP response. The PEHR
would then request all allowed documents via ITI-18
from the Registry and retrieve the matching ones via
Figure 5 UML sequence diagram of workflow 1: recording a patient’s consent. This UML sequence diagram shows the actors involved in
recording a patient’s consent with COMS in an integrated RHIN using the Heidelberg Personal Electronic Health Record architecture as an
example.
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ITI-43 from the Repository which are then presented to
the physician in the PEHR GUI.
Discussion
Our analysis identified the delta between the IHE BPPC
profile definitions and the requirements of the German
legislation for opt-in scenarios. With COMS we devel-
oped a method and a tool to overcome this gap by elec-
tronically recording a patient’s consent using the IHE
BPPC profile, CDA documents as well as XACML and
demonstrated feasibility by integrating COMS into the
PEHR of the Rhine-Neckar Region.
The selected technologies and tools have proven to be
quite sufficient as they represent state-of-the-art tech-
nology and fit smoothly into the existing systems land-
scape and development environments. The usage of
Open Source Software facilitated cost efficient and
quick results. The employment of IHE profiles and
worldwide standards like HL7 and XACML ensures
technical interoperability not only within our own
systems environment but also with other systems and
hence the COMS approach and tools can easily be
adapted by other regions according to their own settings
and needs. However, from the authors’ point of view the
application of worldwide approaches like IHE is ambigu-
ous; on one side they are without alternative for estab-
lishing technically interoperable systems in healthcare;
on the other hand, due to their nature, they sometimes
suffer from a lack of granularity on the conceptual level
and with respect to definitions, demanding for custo-
mized solutions as outlined here.
Many existing solutions (e.g. [5,6]) have been explicitly
designed and geared towards dedicated settings. In con-
trast to those, our standards-based approach of COMS
represents a universally deployable architecture which
benefits from its flexibility and can hence be used in any
setting where the management of patients’ consents is
required. It is capable of managing advanced or non-
advanced patient privacy consents for both opt-in and
opt-out based RHIN. Also advanced consents beyond
Figure 6 UML sequence diagram of workflow 2: publishing documents by primary systems. This UML sequence diagram demonstrates
the actors involved in publishing documents with COMS in an integrated RHIN using the Heidelberg Personal Electronic Health Record
architecture as an example.
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the scope of the BPPC profile can be generated by the
patient dynamically via the CCS and can afterwards be
validated by the CMS.
Other than proposed by the BPPC profile, the pro-
posed solution can be used as centralized policy enfor-
cement point, which is represented by CMS and which
is essential for legal compliance in a German setting.
Otherwise, connected systems could gain knowledge of
consent policies they are not meant to know.
According to the German legislation, the transfer of
any kind of data is forbidden unless the patient has
opted-in. Thus, a proper opt-in has to be incorporated
into the whole process as was described in the integra-
tion section. Another aspect is that we do not use confi-
dentialityCodes in order to enforce the consent due to
the limited nature of those codes. This offers the advan-
tage of not touching all documents in a repository in
the case of a revision of the patient consent. Further-
more, even old documents can be processed. The princi-
ple is that each patient has got several medical
documents but always only one consent document. All
medical documents underlie certain policies defined in
the one consent document. The centralized PEP
enforces these policies in contrast to several decentra-
lized PEPs. Many primary systems (e.g. HIS) can process
HL7 messages in order to communicate with the centra-
lized PEP. The implementation, certification and main-
tenance of various decentralized PEPs is extremely
sophisticated and costly in the long run, especially with
RHIN increasing in size.
The proposed COMS is a stand-alone application which
has pros and cons. One major set of advantages is that it
can be used together with any off-the-shelf XDS.b imple-
mentation in otherwise proprietary settings as long as the
interfacing to the COMS conforms with standards and
supports various other use cases requiring patients’ con-
sents, like e.g. the clinical research domain. Its main disad-
vantage is the comparatively complex and extensive
interfacing with a multitude of message interactions,
which is obviously less fault tolerant and may present
security issues. Alternatively the functionality of CMS can
be directly integrated into an XDS.b Registry and Reposi-
tory which would reduce the message complexity and can
potentially improve the overall system performance.
Our present COMS implementation has some limita-
tions. Security aspects like logging, authentication and
Figure 7 UML sequence diagram of workflow 3: viewing published documents. This UML sequence diagram shows the involved actors
when viewing published documents with COMS in an integrated RHIN using the Heidelberg Personal Electronic Health Record architecture as
an example.
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authorization of the involved actors are not yet imple-
mented due to the fact that the reference implementa-
tion of COMS is deployed in a closed network which
secures all communications via secure socket layer
inside a virtual private network. However, these ele-
ments will be addressed in future releases.
Conclusions
The here proposed and developed architecture solves
the consent issue for German RHINs by providing a leg-
ally compliant solution combinded with an efficient way
of integrating primary systems into the network. Addi-
tionally it also supports opt-out scenarios, is very flex-
ible and can be adapted to other settings in other
regions worldwide. However, the COMS may not be
considered an out of the box solution. Obviously an
adaptation to the respective local requirements and
rules of the affinity domain has to be undertaken but
this can be achieved without complete redesign within
the general framework of the proposed architecture by
customization and parameterization. When privacy poli-
cies shall be generated dynamically, at least an MPI and
a healthcare provider directory service like PORS are
required.
As for today, many German projects including the
ministerial ones mainly focus on proprietary architec-
tures and communication protocols, often justified with
deficits in existing global standards. We hope that our
three main achievements, solving the consent issue for
IHE, providing a blueprint for a standard-based archi-
tecture, and demonstrating its viability in the PEHR pro-
ject in the Rhine-Neckar Region, all together will
substantially promote the broader usage and deployment
of IHE-based RHINs in Germany.
At present the COMS is in alpha release phase and
will be open sourced with its first release candidate at
the Open eHealth Foundation.
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